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MILLER v. STEWART: VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL BY
LESS THAN ALL PLAINTIFFS UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
In Miller v. Stewart,' the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Illinois held that the voluntary dismissal by
some but less than all plaintiffs is permissible under Rule 41(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 This decision focuses atten-
tion on the conflict in the federal courts as to whether 41(a) dealing
with voluntary dismissal is applicable to voluntary dismissal by
less than all plaintiffs, or whether Rule 21 concerning midjoinder of
parties, or Rule 15(a) dealing with amendments is the proper tool
to effect this type of dismissal. This Note will analyze the de-
cision of the Stewart case and evaluate the soundness of the de-
cision in light of Rules 41(a), 21, and 15(a) of the Federal Rules
with a view towards determining which rule is most proper in
cases where less than all plaintiffs wish to dismiss.
Miller v. Stewart3 arose out of an automobile accident in which
a truck driven by plaintiff Icy Miller, with plaintiffs Harold Miller,
Gerald Miller, and Kimberly Ann Miller as passengers, collided
with an automobile driven by defendant Donna Stewart, an em-
ployee of defendant John Pate. The truck was allegedly owned by
plaintiff Owen Miller.
The case was originally instituted in the Circuit Court of Har-
den County, Illinois, but was later removed to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois. Federal juris-
diction was based on diversity of citizenship, the plaintiffs being
citizens and residents of Illinois and the defendants being citizens
of North Carolina. The amounts in controversy as to plaintiffs Icy
Miller and Harold Miller each exceeded the sum of $10,000. The
amounts claimed by the other three plaintiffs were less than the
requisite jurisdictional amount.
4
Plaintiffs Icy Miller and Harold Miller filed notice of dismissal
pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5
Up to that time no answer or motion for summary judgment had
been filed.' Plaintiffs Gerald Miller, Owen Miller, and Kimberly
1. 43 F.R.D. 409 (E.D. Ill. 1967).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
3. 43 F.R.D. 409 (E.D. Ill. 1967).
4. In C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 32, at 90 (1963) the author
writes:
There has been a requirement, in some classes of cases, that more
than a certain minimum amount be in controversy to bring cases to
the federal trial courts. The Judiciary Act of 1789 fixed this sum
at $500, and it was increased to $2,000 in 1887, $3,000 in 1911, and
to the present figure of $10,000 in 1958. For jurisdiction to exist,
where the requirements are applicable, the amount in controversy,
exclusive of interest and costs, must exceed the stated sum.
Id. at 90.
5. See p. 152 infra.
6. Rule 41 (a) (1) of the FED. R. Civ. P. dismissal can be effected
Notes
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Ann Miller moved that their claims be remanded to the state court.
Defendants moved to vacate the notice of dismissal, on the con-
tention that voluntary dismissal under Rule 41 (a) (1) does not au-
thorize dismissal by less than all plaintiffs.
The district court denied defendants motion on the grounds
that: (1) there had been no answer or motion for summary judg-
ment and, therefore, Rule 41 (a) (1) was applicable to this dismissal;
and (2) defendants would suffer no prejudice or hardship if Icy
Miller and Harold Miller were dismissed.
Since, after dismissal, the amounts in controvery no longer
exceeded the requisite jurisdictional amount, the defendants had
no right to retain federal jurisdiction.' Therefore, the suit as to the
remaining three plaintiffs was remanded to the Circuit Court of
Harden County.
BACKGROUND
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
procedure in the federal courts was governed by the Practice Con-
formity Act.8 Under that statute federal practice in civil actions
at law was generally controlled by the practice of the courts of the
state where the court was sittingY It was hoped that the federal
courts would be prevented from reaching different substantive re-
sults through the use of different procedural methods.
The adoption of the Federal Rules was not intended to com-
pletely change the existing procedural rules and thereby institute
an entirely new method of practice. Rather, the purpose of the
Rules was to establish a uniform procedure for all federal courts
and to state rules plainly in order to eliminate as much surprise
as possible from litigation.' 0 Thus in analyzing Rules 41(a), 21,
by mere notice if it is given before an answer or motion for summary
judgment is filed. See notes 17 and 18 infra and accompanying text.
7. The court has a choice whether or not to remand when, in an
action removed to a federal court from a state court, the jurisdictional
amount is destroyed. St. Paul Indemnity Co. v. Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,
294 (1938).
8. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 924, 17 Stat. 196.
That the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding
in other than equity and admiralty causes in the circuit and district
courts of the United States shall conform, as near as may be, to
the practice, pleadings, and modes of proceeding existing at the
time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within
which such circuit or district courts are held, any rule of court to
the contrary not withstanding: Provided, however, that nothing
herein contained shall alter the rules of evidence under the laws
of the United States, and as practiced in the courts thereof.
9. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 394 (1937).
10. Cf. Merrill v. United Air Lines, 151 F. Supp. 105, 105 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
and 15(a) it is necessary to look at not only the actual wording of
the rules and their judicial interpretation, but also pre-Federal
Rule procedure to see what was done in the fields of voluntary
dismissal, misjoinder, and amendments.
RULE 41 (a)
Rule 41 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
(a) Voluntary dismissal: Effect Thereof
(1) By plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to the
provisions of Rule 23(e),11 of Rule 66,12 and of any statute
of the United States,13 an action may be dismissed by the
plaintiff without order of the court (i) by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party
of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, which-
ever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal
signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.
Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipu-
lation the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in
any Court of the United States or of any state an action
based on or including the same claim.
(2) By order of Court: Except as provided in para-
graph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not
be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon an order
of the Court and upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by
a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss the action shall not be dismissed against
the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can re-
main pending for an independent adjudication by the court.
Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under
this paragraph is without prejudice.
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules a plaintiff could
generally dismiss an action voluntarily up to the time the case was
delivered to the jury. 4 Furthermore, the plaintiff could dismiss
the action as often as he desired.15 The results of this practice are
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides: "A class action shall not be dis-
missed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of
the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the
class in such manner as the court directs." Thus, Rule 23 (e) deals with
dismissal. of a class action and is not applicable to this discusion.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 66 in part provides: "An action wherein a receiver
has been appointed shall not be dismissed except by order of the court."
This rule applies to dismissal of receivers and is not applicable to this
discussion.
13. This refers primarily to two statutes: (1) 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1964)
which deals with dismissal of a suit brought against an alien; and (2) 31
U.S.C. § 232 (1964) dealing with dismissal of a bankruptcy suit. Neither
is applicable to this discussion.
14. Barrett v. Virginian Ry., 250 U.S. 473, 476 (1919); American
Electrotype Co. v. Kerschbaum, 105 F.2d 764, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1939);
Derick v. Taylor, 171 Mass. 444, 445, 50 N.E. 1038, 1039 (1898).
15. Poplarville Sawmill Co. v. Driver, 17 Ga. App. 674, 88 S.E. 36
(1916); cf. Mintz v. Soule, 200 Mich. 9, 11, 166 N.W. 491 (1918).
Notes
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readily apparent. Dismissal was used as a harassing technique;
a defendant was brought to court and then repeatedly dismissed.
The defendant would offer to settle out of court just to finish the
action. The dismissal rule was both prejudicial and costly to de-
fendants. Federal Rule 41(a) had a two-fold corrective purpose.
First, it set forth and simplified a practice which, prior to enact-
ment of the Federal Rules, had never been clearly explained.10
Before the rule, state statutes and the common law governed in the
federal courts by virtue of the Conformity Act. In the case of
voluntary dismissal there was a great variance in the rules. Sec-
ondly, Rule 41(a) limited dismissal to an early stage of the pro-
ceeding.17 This virtually eliminated prejudice to the defendant.
Even if he had to prepare for a second law suit his expenses for the
first suit would be at a minimum. This was emphasized by the
1946 amendment to the rule which added the phrase, "or of a
motion for summary judgment." Thus, the service by the adverse
party of a motion for summary judgment was given the same effect
as service of an answer in preventing unlimited dismissal by the
plaintiff.18
Viewing the historical background of the rule, it is not appar-
ent whether the authors of the Federal Rules planned to allow
this rule to cover situations where less than all plaintiffs wished
to dismiss an action voluntarily. Court decisions must therefore
be analyzed to obtain a true interpretation of the rule.
The majority of circuit court decisions' 9 hold that Rule 41(a)
may be used to dismiss voluntarily as to less than all parties. The
court in Young v. Wilky Carrier Corp.20 held the plaintiff could
16. Ingold v. Ingold, 30 F. Supp. 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
17. Cf. Engelhardt v. Bell and Howell Co., 299 F.2d 480, 482 (8th
Cir. 1962); Stevenson v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 355, 357 (M.D. Tenn.
1961).
18. MOORE, Federal Rules Pamphlet 820 (1968). A motion for sum-
mary judgment is often made before answer is filed. A large amount of
work can be involved since affidavits and interrogatories are usually filed
to build support for the case. Therefore if voluntary dismissal were al-
lowed after a defendant made a motion for summary judgment, the de-
fendant could be prejudiced.
19. Of the circuits which have ruled on the question the first,
third, and seventh circuits and at times the second circuit have ruled that
less than all parties to an action may dismiss voluntarily. See, Young v.
Wilky Carrier Corp., 150 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1945); Lyman v. United States,
138 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 800 (1944); Broadway
and Ninety-Sixth Street Realty Corp. v. Loew's, 23 F.R.D. 9 (E.D.N.Y.
1958); Fair v. Trans World Airlines, 22 F.R.D. 60 (E.D. Ill. 1957); United
States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 13 F.R.D. 490 (N.D. Ill. 1953).
20. 150 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1945). The action arose out of an automo-
bile accident. Plaintiff brought suit against Wilky Carrier Corporation and
voluntarily dismiss one of the two defendants under Rule 41(a)
(2). The only reasoning offered was that such a dismissal was
within the discretion of the trial court. The concurring opinion in
Young, citing Lyman v. United States,21 came to the same con-
clusion; that is, dismissal was within the discretion of the court.
However, an investigation of the Lyman case shows that once
again no reasoning is given for the use of 41(a). There the court
allowed plaintiff to dismiss voluntarily the first of four causes of
action. This situation is analogous to one where less than all plain-
tiffs dismiss an action against a defendant.22 The court in Lyman
held a motion by plaintiff to dismiss after an answer had been filed
was within the sound discretion of the trial judge.23 It appears that
both Lyman and Young, by allowing dismissal by less than all
parties under Rule 41(a), were not concerned about the entire scope
of the rule and were willing to focus attention only on the words in
Rule 41(a) (2) reading: "an action shall not be dismissed save upon
an order of the Court and upon such terms and conditions as the
Court deems proper. '24 The interpretation of this rule by the Ly-
man and Young courts appears to be that since Rule 41(a) is en-
titled "Voluntary Dismissal", if a plaintiff moves for this type of
dismissal and it fits no other part of the Rule, the court should use
its discretion to either allow or deny the motion and no further
reasoning is necessary.
In Fair v. Trans World Airlines25 the court similarly reasoned
that when less than all parties move for voluntary dismissal, dis-
missal or non-dismissal of the action must be determined through
the exercise of the court's discretion, citing the Young case. The
court added the condition that "in the exercise of this discretion
the court is duty bound to consider the rights of the respective
Earl L. Welty. Plaintiff asserted her inability to prove liability as to
Welty and voluntary dismissal was granted under 41(a) (2). Wilky ap-
pealed since a Pennsylvania law provides for contribution between defend-
ants in a negligence case.
21. 138 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 800 (1944).
22. The courts in both Lyman v. United States, supra note 21, and
Establissements Neyrpic v. Gardner, 175 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Texas 1959),
looked to Rule 41(a) to see if they could dismiss less than all claims.
The Lyman case decided Rule 41(a) was applicable while the Gardner
case found Rule 41 (a) inapplicable. The decisions point to the fact that
whether dismissing less than all parties or less than all claims, many of the
same considerations are present. In both instances there is a chance that
the parties to the action will have to defend against two lawsuits-the one
they are involved in at present and a possible later suit involving the
party or claim that was dismissed from the original action. Also in both
situations, the amount of time that the opposing party has spent preparing
for their case against either the party or claim which is being dismissed
is taken into consideration. In other words a party can be prejudiced just
as easily by dismissal of one of several parties or one of several claims.
Therefore in the field being covered by this paper, dismissal of less than
all parties and dismissal of less than all claims is analogous.
23. Lyman v. United States, 138 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1943).
24. See p. 152 supra.
25. 22 F.R.D. 60 (E.D. IM. 1967).
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parties to the litigation."26 Although the decision expressly states
that prejudice to other parties is to be taken into consideration, the
basic reasoning for allowing this type of dismissal under Rule 41(a)
remains the same as in the above cases: that the court has the dis-
cretion to grant voluntary dismissal as to less than all parties.
Upon examination it is possible to see the underlying factor in
the majority rationale. These courts feel it is inconceivable that
the Federal Rules would not allow for voluntary dismissal as to
less than all parties.27  Since the authors of the Federal Rules
must have wished to allow this type of dismissal, what better place
to allow for it than under Rule 41(a) which allows for voluntary
dismissal? Approaching the rule in this way, however, and using
such terms as "it is in the court's discretion," without looking at
the words of the rule and without interpreting the rule is not
necessarily sound legal reasoning.
A final observation should be made concerning the reliance in
the Young, Lyman and Trans World cases on the use of discretion
in dismissing an action as to less than all plaintiffs. Each of these
decisions state that under Rule 41(a) (2) the court can use its dis-
cretion to dismiss one of several parties.28 In this way it can deter-
mine the status of any of the parties remaining in the action and
refuse to dismiss if prejudice will result. Since these courts have
decided that Rule 41(a) (2) applies to voluntary dismissal of less
than all parties, however, it is submitted that if an answer or mo-
tion for summary judgment has not been filed they must allow
Rule 41 (a) (1) to control; and these parties could voluntarily dismiss
without order of the court simply by filing a notice of dismissal.
In other words, less than all the parties could dismiss without the
court ever determining whether there is any prejudice to the re-
maining parties. If this were allowed the whole purpose of Rule
41(a) would be defeated. Allowing less than all parties to dismiss
would further the chances of a second lawsuit; and it is no longer
26. Id. at 63.
27. The Young, Lyman, and Trans World courts all decided that it
was in their power to dismiss as to less than all parties or less than all
claims. They then seized on the use of Rule 41(a) to effect this dis-
missal. The court in Broadway and Ninety-Sixth Street Realty Corp. v.
Loew's, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 9 (E.D.N.Y. 1950) specifically stated that it was in
the power of the federal courts to dismiss less than all parties and it
would allow the motion under 41 (a). The Miller court relied heavily on
the Loew case to support its decision that Rule 41(a) could be used to
effect this type of dismissal.
28. Young v. Wilky Carrier Corp., 150 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1945); Ly-
man v. United States, 138 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1943); Fair v. Trans World
Airlines, 22 F.R.D. 60, 63 (E.D. Ill. 1957).
the case, as it was before the inception of the Federal Rules, that the
annoyance of a second litigation furnishes insufficient grounds for
denying the plaintiff permission to dismiss his complaint.29
A minority of the circuit courts have held that 41(a) is not
applicable to dismissal of less than all parties. They have looked
to the actual construction and wording of the Rule itself to decide
its inapplicability. The leading minority case is Harvey Aluminum
v. American Cyanamid.0 Plaintiffs attempted to voluntarily dis-
miss one of the three defendants without a court order under Rule
41(a) (1). The court would not allow this stating, "rule 41 (a) (1) pro-
vides for the voluntary dismissal of an 'action' not a 'claim'; the
word 'action' as used in the Rules denotes the entire controversy,
whereas 'claim' refers to what has traditionally been termed 'cause
of action'."31 Court interpretations of the Federal Rules independ-
ent of Rule 41(a) also sustain this distinction between claim and
action. The court in Windelman v. General Motors 2 gave its
opinion on the definition of "action" as used in the Federal Rules by
saying the following:
The term "action" does not mean a "cause of action" under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Indeed, the expres-
sion "cause of action" is avoided in the Rules and the word
"claim" is used instead. Pleadings set forth the "claims"
and defenses of the parties. Rule 8.3 Rule 234 provides
that there shall be one form of action to be known as"civil action," which is commenced by filing a complaint
29. Piedmont Interstate Fair Ass'n v. Bean, 209 F.2d 942, 946 (4th
Cir. 1954).
30. 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953). The
facts of this case were: On December 5, 1952, Harvey Aluminum brought
suit against American Cyanamid. At the time they filed the complaint
Harvey received a preliminary restraining order against Cyanamid, and
Harvey Machine Co. and Berbice were added as parties plaintiff and de-
fendant respectively. On December 15, 1952 the temporary order was dis-
solved and an amended complaint added Reynolds as a defendant. On
January 19, 1953 the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to
all defendants under Rule 41 (a) (1). The court would not allow this,
stressing that the purpose of 41(a) (1) was to limit dismissal to an early
stage of the proceeding and in this case a large amount of work was done
by defendants in research and preparation for plaintiff's motion for pre-
liminary injunction. Plaintiffs then tried to dismiss Reynolds since Rey-
nolds did not participate in the proceeding relative to the motion for pre-
liminary injunction.
31. Id. at 108; accord, Robertson v. Limestone Mfg. Co., 20 F.R.D. 365
(W.D.S.C. 1957).
32. 48 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1942)
33. FED R. Civ. P. 8(a) provides:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief whether an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall con-
tain (1) a short and plain statement of the ground upon which
the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has juris-
diction and the court needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to
support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judg-
ment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief
in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
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with the court. Rule 3.35 We are advised in Note 2 under
Rule 2 that "reference to actions at law or suits in equity
in all statutes should now be treated as referring to the
civil action prescribed in these rules.
3 6
Furthermore, in Original Ballet-Russe v. Ballet Theater87 it was
held: "[F] or the traditional and hydra-headed phrase 'cause of
action' the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have substituted the
word 'claim.' It is used to denote the aggregate of operative facts
which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts."8
The authors of the Federal Rules were particular in their
choice of words as seen by their disregard of the phrase "cause
of action" and their substitution of "claim," and the use of the
word "action" to designate the entire litigation. It is not likely
that they made an inadvertant slip when writing Rule 41(a) and
used the word "action" intending its interpretation to mean that
less than all parties to a litigation could dismiss their claim, leaving
the remaining parties to litigate their indivdual clams. And even
if a mistake of this nature had been made when the Rule was
originally promulgated, the advisory committee could have cor-
rected the mistake on any one of the four occasions when Rule 41
was amended 9 by either correcting or adding other provisions.
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is submitted that the
court in Miller v. Stewart was in error in refusing to allow defend-
ant's motion to vacate the notice of dismissal which plaintiffs Icy
Miller and Harold Miller filed pursuant to Rule 41 (a) (1). The court
based its opinion on three grounds. First, the fact that in Fair v.
Trans World Airlines4 and Broadway and Ninety-Sixty Street
Realty Corporation v. Loew's Inc.41 it was held that Rule 41(a)
governed and allowed voluntary dismissal of less than all parties.
The Trans World case has been discussed and found inappropriate
since the court relied solely on its discretion and failed to use any
other reasoning. The Loew court based its decision on the idea
that the Federal Courts must be allowed to dismiss as to less than
all parties. This being true, they felt it made no difference if Rule
15(a), 21, or 41(a) (2) was used. The Miller court considered these
cases sufficiently well-reasoned to serve as precedent in allowing
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
36. 48 F. Supp. 490, 494.
37. 133 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1943).
38. Id. at 189.
39. Rule 41(a) was amended in 1946 when the phrase "summary
judgment" was added and in 1968 to change the reference from 23(c) to
23 (e). Furthermore Rule 41(b) was amended in 1946, 1963, and 1966.
40. 22 F.R.D. 60 (E.D. Ill. 1967).
41. 23 F.R.D. 9 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
Rule 41(a) (1) to dismiss less than all parties. Considering the
minority finding that the word "action" limits the scope of the rule,
it appears that the Miller court should not have allowed Trans
World and Loew to control their thinking. Secondly, the court in
Miller stated:
Each plaintiff in the suit has a separate and distinct cause
of action from each of the other plaintiffs. There is no
question but if plaintiff had filed separate actions, the
notice of dismissal would have been effective under Rule
41(a) (1) and dismissal would have been effected upon the
filing of the notice. It is also true that if all plaintiffs had
filed notice of dismissal, the notice under the facts here
presented would not be subject to contest.
42
Taken alone, what the court says is correct. If each of the plaintiffs
had filed a separate action based on his own claim, then the rule
would allow the individual to voluntarily dismiss his claim against
the defendants. Furthermore, if all the plaintiffs moved to dismiss
the action against all the defendants, their action would have been
within the scope of the rule. In each of these situations, however,
the entire action or controversy is being dismissed. These situ-
ations do not lead to the conclusion that some of the plaintiffs can
dismiss the defendants since this is dismissal of only part of the
action or controversy, and Rule 41(a) should not cover this situ-
ation.
Finally, the court based its decision on the belief that defend-
ants would suffer no prejudice, hardship or burden by dismissing
plaintiffs Icy Miller and Harold Miller.43 Examining the case, we
see that it was originally brought in a state court.44 Defendants
moved the action to a federal court and began preparation for the
trial there. If the two plaintiffs are dismissed the case will once
again be removed to the state court. Once there, even after the
litigation is ended, the defendants face actions by the two plaintiffs
who were dismissed.
The purpose of the Federal Rules is to allow a just, speedy and
inexpensive end to the litigation.45 This being the case, a court
once possessing jurisdiction over all the parties-in-interest, should
not grant a motion made for the purpose of destroying federal
jurisdiction.4" As a consequence, defendants then spend more time
waiting for the outcome of their litigation and also face the possi-
bility of a second lawsuit.
42. Miller v. Stewart, 43 F.R.D. 409, 412 (E.D. Ill. 1967).
43. Id. at 413.
44. Id. at 409.
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. The Rule provides:
These rules govern the procedure in the United States District
Courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at
law, or in equity, or in admiralty, with exceptions stated in
Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and in-
expensive determination of every action.




Dicta in Harvey Aluminum v. American Cyanimid47 indicated
that although Rule 41(a) could not be used to effect dismissal of less
than all parties, Rule 21 could. Rule 21 says:
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an
action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the
court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at
any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.
Any claim against a party may be served and proceeded
with severally.
48
At common law misjoinder 49 was cause for dismissal.5 0 It was
an extremely harsh rule. Under the code system in some states the
rule remained as harsh as at common law, while in many others the
rule was mollified by permitting the party to amend his complaint
so that the action would not have to be dismissed.51 Thus there
appeared to be a trend in the code system to soften the rule on
misjoinder.
Rule 21 of the Federal Rules continues this trend. It allows
a party who has been misjoined to be dropped from the action
without dismissal of the entire complaint.52 This concession is in
line with modern pleading which recognizes that a person should
not be put out of court on a technicality.
This background should help answer the question whether
dicta in the Harvey case indicating that Rule 21 is the proper means
of voluntarily dismissing less than all parties is correct. Harvey
cited two major cases in support of this proposition. First, in
Weaver v. Marcus53 the court found that one of several defendants
could be dropped on the motion of a party under Rule 21. The
motion was made by plaintiffs in order to perfect federal juris-
diction. The court focused its attention on the following language:
"Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion
of any part, or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just. ' 54 It decided that Rule 21 was applicable to
47. 205 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1953).
48. FED. R. CIv. P. 21.
49. "Misjoinder is the improper joining together of parties to a suit,
as plaintiffs or defendants, or different causes of action." BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 971 (4th ed. 1968).
50. Rhoads v. Booth, 14 Iowa 575, 577 (1863); Gerry v. Gerry, 77
Mass. (6 Gray) 381 (1858); cf. Tully v. Triangle Films Corp., 229 F. 297,
299 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
51. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 58 at 368 (1947).
52. Eliot v. Geare Marson, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 301, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1939).
53. 165 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1948).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 21.
dismissal by the plaintiff of one but not all defendants, but it was
within the court's discretion whether to allow this dismissal. The
court reasoned that the defendant who would be dropped was a
necessary party but not an indispensable party to the action 55 since
the action could have been originally maintained without this de-
fendant. The defendant, therefore, could be dropped under Rule 21.
The second case cited by Harvey was Savoia Film S.A.I. v.
Vanguard Films.516 The facts were essentially the same as in
Weaver. Plaintiff wished to drop one of two defendants from the
action. The Savoia court based its decision on a discussion of the
same part of Rule 21 relied on in Weaver and held that the defend-
ant who was to be dropped was a necessary but not an indispensable
party, and therefore allowed him to be dropped.
There are two basic faults with the rationale in these two cases.
First, they are in effect allowing voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff
as to less than an entire action without attendant safeguards. Even
Rule 41(a) (1) dealing with a voluntary dismissal not only involves
dismissal of an entire action but also establishes other safeguards
dealing with voluntary dismissal; and the background of the rule
suggests factors for a judge to consider when he is using his dis-
cretion under Rule 41(a) (2). These are: (1) dismissal should occur
at an early stage of the proceeding; and (2) a judge should consider
the prejudice to the party who may be dismissed. Rule 21 does not
provide any of these safeguards and allows a party to be dropped
"at any stage of the action. ' 57 In light of the safeguards under
Rule 41, the "Voluntary Dismissal Rule," it is not likely that the
authors of the Federal Rules wished to allow for voluntary dis-
missal under Rule 21 where a party could be dropped at any stage
of the proceeding with a great likelihood that he would be prej-
udiced thereby.
Secondly, a look at the whole scope of the Federal Rules and
particularly Rule 21 points to the real purpose of this rule. Rule
1858 of the Federal Rules deals with joinder of claims, Rule 1919
55. In Sternburg v. American Bantam Car Co., 76 F. Supp. 426 (W.D.
Pa. 1948) the court said:
A necessary party is a person having an interest in the contro-
versy, and who ought to be made party so that the court may act
on the rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine,
the entire controversy, and to complete justice by adjusting all
the rights involved in it.
Id. at 438. Matthies v. Seymoor Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64 (D. Conn. 1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959) provided: "An indis-
pensable party is one whose joinder in a suit is compulsory." Id. at 74.
56. 10 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 21.
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 18. This rule deals with joinder of claims and
remedies.
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 19. This rule describes persons to be joined if
feasible and determination by the court where joinder is not feasible.
It thus deals with indispensable parties.
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with a joinder of indispensable parties and Rule 2060 with permis-
sive joinder. It appears that the court in United States v. E.I. Du-
Pont De Nemours and Company6' was correct in its determination
that in light of Rules 18, 19 and 20, Rule 21 provides for any
difficulty that might arise because of the wide possibility of joinder
under these preceding rules. Moreover, the first sentence in Rule
21 states, "Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an
action,"6' 2 indicating that the rule deals explicitly with misjoinder.
In Weaver and Savoia the courts completely disregarded this first
and controlling sentence of the rule. In Kerr v. Compagnie De
Ultramar3 the court ruled contra to the Weaver and Savoia cases.
Kerr denied plaitiff's motion to dismiss under Rule 21 and recog-
nized the interpretation made in the DuPont case by stating:
Technically there has been no misjoinder of parties here.
From all that appears thus far the parties are correctly
joined as joint tortfeasors or as liable in the alternative;
the dimensions of the action are no larger than the rules
permit. Because however of the limitations on federal
jurisdiction, such otherwise proper joinder destroys the
jurisdiction of the court. Rule 21 was adopted to obviate
the harsh common law adherence to the technical rules of
joinder and not to deal with problems of defective jurisdic-
tion. Here the plaintiff is not seeking to drop a party in
order to cure defects of misjoinder or non-joinder.
4
Kerr recognizes that Rule 21 deals with misjoinder; it does not act
to effect voluntary dismissal which could cure jurisdictional defects,
provide jurisdictional defects or perform any of the other uses to
which voluntary dismissal is put. Therefore Rule 21 should not be
used to dismiss a party unless there has been a misjoinder of the
parties.
RULE 15 (a)
State courts, which under the Conformity Act established pro-
cedural guidelines for the federal courts before the existence of the
Federal Rules, allowed amendment of the pleadings to act as a
voluntary dismissal.6 5 In the absence of a specific statute, such
dismissal is reached in the following manner. After an amendment
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 20. This rule deals with permissive joinder of
parties thereby describing necessary but not indispensable parties.
61. 13 F.R.D. 490, 493 (N.D. Ill. 1953).
62. See p. 159 supra.
63. 250 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1957).
64. Id. at 864.
65. Green v. Ellis, 145 Cal. 241, 88 S.E. 976 (1916); see H.S. Leyman
Co. v. Piggley-Wiggley Corp., 45 Abs. 528, 68 N.E.2d 486 (Ct. App. 1944);
cf. Dingman v. Spengler, 371 S.W.2d 416, 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
to a pleading is filed and accepted, the new pleading governs the
case. Thus, if a person who appeared in the original pleading is
eliminated from an amended pleading, that person is no longer a
party to the case. 66
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules, which clarifies when amend-
ments may be made and what rules must be followed in amending,
reads:
A party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of course
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if
the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is
permitted and the action has not been placed upon the
trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20
days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his
pleadings only by leave of court or by written consent of
the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an
amended pleading within the time remaining for response
to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of
the amended pleading whichever period may be longer, un-
less the court otherwise orders.
Looking at the rule and its background, it appears that amend-
ments could be used for voluntary dismissal by less than all
the plaintiffs. Dismissal was allowed by amendment before the
rule;617 and under the Federal Rules the tendency of the federal
courts has been consistently in favor of great liberality in the
allowance of amendments to pleadings.6 8
The Kerr case in dicta60 indicated that although Rule 21 could
not be used for dismissal of less than all the parties, amendment of
the pleading under Rule 15 (a) would be the proper means of effect-
ing this type of dismissal. The best reasoned case reaching this
result is Establissements Neyrpic v. Gardner.70 There plaintiffs
wished to amend their complaint to drop the second and third
claims against defendants and continue the case solely on their
first claim. This situation is analogous to the case where two of
three plaintiffs would seek voluntary dismissal against a defend-
ant, leaving one plaintiff to continue the action.7' In the first
situation the two claims could be refiled at a later date and defend-
ants would face a second litigation; in the second situation the two
plaintiffs who dismissed voluntarily could file an action at a later
date and defendants would have a second litigation. The court
explained that Rule 41(a) (2) was not applicable since plaintiff re-
66. Cf. Speckels v. Speckels, 172 Cal. 789, 158 P. 543 (1916).
67. See cases cited note 65 supra.
68. Commissioner v. Finley, 265 F.2d 885, 888 (10th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 834 (1959); Brown v. Dunbar and Sullivan Dredging
Co., 189 F.2d 871, 875 (2d Cir. 1951); Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union
v. Donnelly, 121 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1941); Rosen v. Rex Amusement Co.,
14 F.R.D. 75, 78 (D.D.C. 1952).
69. Kerr v. Compagnie De Ultramar, 250 F.2d 860, 864 (2d Cir. 1957).
70. 175 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
71. See note 22 supra.
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tained one claim and thus it was not a dismissal of an entire action.
It then reasoned that amendment to eliminate two claims has the
effect of voluntary dismissal. In this case the amendment was
allowed, but the claims were dismissed with prejudice to prevent
them from being retried.
7 2
Therefore, we see that amendment of the complaint under Rule
15(a) has the effect of voluntary dismissal. The judge in his dis-
cretion can refuse to allow amendment if defendant will be prej-
udiced. Analysis of the rule shows that it has the same safeguards
as are allowed in Rule 41(a). It would limit voluntary dismissal
without order of the court to an early stage of the proceeding since
a party may only amend his pleading once as a matter or course be-
fore a responsive pleading is served. Other than this, a party must
ask permission of the court to be allowed to amend and must pro-
vide reasons for the request. 3 The court in its discretion can re-
fuse to grant the leave to amend. Finally, as seen by the Gardner
case,74 the party or claim can be dismissed with prejudice which
will insure that voluntary dismissal is not used as a harassing
technique.
CONCLUSION
The use of Rule 15(a) to effect dismissal by less than all plain-
tiffs against a defendant is the best way to keep within the spirit of
the Federal Rules. Although the Rules are to be liberally con-
strued, this does not mean they are to be misconstrued.
Rule 41(a) specifically refers to dismissal of an action as this
term is used throughout the Federal Rules. Unless the entire con-
troversy is to be dismissed, Rule 41(a) should not be used to dismiss
by less than all plaintiffs. When there is only one plaintiff in the
case or when the entire action is being dropped, there will be no
further lawsuit after dismissal; courts favor disposal of litigation
in this manner. Where less than all plaintiffs dismiss, however,
the courts which allow Rule 41(a) to control make dismissal almost
automatic if it occurs early in the proceeding. Not only will the
lawsuit continue but there is a strong possibility of a second law-
suit.
72. "A dismissal with prejudice implies a decision on the merits,
either after an adjudication of right or pursuant to an agreement of the
parties." Pueblo De Taos v. Archuleta, 64 F.2d 807, 812 (10th Cir. 1933).
73. See Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 523 (10th Cir.
1950); Rossi v. McCloskey and Co., 149 F. Supp. 638, 641 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
74. Establissements Neyrpic v. Gardner, 175 F. Supp. 355, 358 (S.D.
Tex. 1949).
Similarly, Rule 21 should not be used to effect a dismissal by
less than all parties. It is a misjoinder rule. Courts which allow
parties to be dropped or added indiscriminately under this rule
have not considered it in its entire context. The Federal Rules are
meant to be a clear and precise set of procedural standards; and to
a large degree they succeed in this purpose. There is no reason to
read something into a rule on the basis of a partial reading of that
rule out of context. When emphasis is placed on only a portion of
a statute improper interpretation can result. This occurs when the
court disregards the first and controlling sentence of Rule 21
which states that it is a misjoinder rule, and focuses only on the
sentence allowing parties to be dropped or added upon the order
of the court.
By using the amending process of Rule 15(a), voluntary dis-
missal of less than all plaintiffs can be allowed without miscon-
struing the rule or without reading anything into the rule. It also
contains the safeguards which keep the power to dismiss volun-
tarily from being abused.
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